Bibframe Work

Machine generated contents note:

PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986

(1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart (1986)

John Moore (University of Edinburgh)

(2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets

Bengt Holmström (MIT)

(3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting

Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics)

(4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories

Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)

(5) Grossman and Hart and Applied Theory

Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)

PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries

(6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : new Directions

Wouter Dessein (Columbia University)

(7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : new Directions"

Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan)

(8) Comment on "Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries : new Directions" by Wouter Dessein

Michael D. Whinston (MIT)

PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization

(9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms

Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics)

(10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms, John Roberts (Stanford University)

(11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model : comments on "Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms," by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen

W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University)

PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance

(12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control

Patrick Bolton (Columbia University)

(13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control"

Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)

(14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance

Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms

(15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing

Josh Lerner (Harvard University)

(16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital

Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

(17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms

Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University)

PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization

(18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization : Past and Future

Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University)

(19) Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization : Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium)

(20) Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization : Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan)

PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade

(21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global : Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production

Pol Antràs (Harvard University)

(22) Comment on Pol Antràs: "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global : Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production"

Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University)

(23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global

Dalia Marin (University of Munich)

PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership

(24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms

Paul Grout (University of Bristol)

(25) Firm Ownership : The Legacy of Grossman and Hart

Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School)

(26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights

Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University)

PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy

(27) Political Treaties as Incomplete Contracts

Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)

(28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy

Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley)

(29) Incomplete Contracting and the Design of Constitutions

Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University)

PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity

(30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Eric Maskin (Harvard University)

(31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

John Moore (University of Edinburgh)

(32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design

Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)

(33) Complexity and Undescribability

Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)

PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication

(34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts : Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation

Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne)

(35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points

Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich)

(36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field

Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)