Bibframe Work

This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.

Table Of Contents

Introduction

Game Trees

Pseudotrees and Order Theory

Extensive Decision Problems

Extensive Forms

Discrete Extensive Forms

Equilibrium

A Mathematical Appendix.

Authorized Access Point

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos The Theory of Extensive Form Games

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Generation Process: DLC marc2bibframe2 v2.5.0

Status: changed

Encoding Level: preliminary

Description Conventions: ISBD: International standard bibliographic descriptionProvider-neutral e-resource MARC record guidelinesResource description and access

Identified By: bf:Local, 21820227

Change Date: 2020-11-25T13:22:35

Creation Date: 2016-07-08

Description Language: English

Assigner: United States, Library of Congress

Bibframe Work

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